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Abstract  
This paper analyses the role that institutional factors play in explaining differences in the capital structure 
of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) across regions belonging to a single country. Specifically, 
it studies the effect of the development of the financial sector and of the economic situation on leverage 
of firms. Furthermore, the standard firm-factor determinants of debt, such as firm size, asset structure, 
profitability, growth, business risk and age are also incorporated. For this empirical study, we use a 
sample of 638 SMEs representing every Spanish region for the period 1999-2007, and apply the panel 
data methodology. Our results suggest that the capital structure depends on the regional financial sector 
and the regional economic situation which implies that institutional factors at regional level help to better 
explain financing decisions of SMEs.  
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Introduction  
 
The study of the determinants of capital structure of companies represents a major line 
of research in finance. According to this research, the capital structure is determined by 
a combination of factors related to the characteristics of the company and the 
environment within which the company does business. 
 
Most empirical studies have focused on the relevance of firm factors in capital structure 
and were carried out using samples of single-country firms. More recently, studies 
analyse if the environment is a factor of influence in financing decisions, as Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) and La Porta et al. (1998) have pointed out. This approach is based on 
the idea that institutional factors affect capital structure choices. Therefore, the 
differences between financial capital systems, fiscal systems, investor protection or the 
degree of economic development in which the firms operate would explain the 
divergences in their debt. The prevalent research examines the effect of certain 
institutional factors on leverage by performing cross-country studies1. Among the 
studies based on samples of large and listed firms, those by Demirguç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999), Booth et al. (2001), De Jong et al. (2008), López-Iturriaga and 
Rodríguez-Sanz (2008), González and González (2008), Fan et al. (2012) and Kirch and 
Terra (2012) deserve mention.  From research performed on samples of SMEs, 
Giannetti (2003), Utrero-González (2007) and Hernández-Cánovas and Koëter-Kant 
(2011) 2 should be noted. 
 
In a more innovative way, studies that analyse the relevance of institutional factors 
using samples of single-country firms are emerging. In this case, the idea is that within 
one country, institutional differences can exist that are notable when choosing the 
capital structure. The influence of local institutional factors is particularly significant for 
SMEs, since they usually have restrictions which limit them to operating within the 
local environment (Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998, 1999). To our knowledge, 
the only study that tackles this issue is that of La Rocca et al. (2010), which 
investigates, in Italy, how certain local institutional differences, using regions as the unit 
of analysis, affect the leverage of SMEs.  
 
Our paper provides new empirical evidence about the role of institutional factors at a 
regional level in SME debt. Specifically, we analyse the effect of the development of 
the financial sector and of the economic situation on the capital structure of firms. 
Moreover, we incorporate the standard firm-factor determinants of leverage which 
include firm size, asset structure, profitability, growth, business risk, and age of the 
firm. This study encompasses all regions of Spain and the sample comprises data from 
638 Spanish SMEs over the period 1999-2007. 
 
This study makes several contributions towards research on capital structure. First, it is 
one of the first studies worldwide to show the influence of regional institutional factors 
on capital structure decisions for small and medium-sized firms. Previous single-
country studies have only considered firm factors, and have failed to consider 
institutional factors. There is only one study of this nature covering a European country 
(the work of La Rocca et al. 2010, in Italy, already cited). Our study, on the one hand, 
complements that of La Rocca et al. (2010) since empirical evidence concerning this 
aspect from more countries is needed in order to draw conclusions of a more general 
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nature. On the other hand, significant differences from the Italian study can be 
identified: Spain is the country studied; we incorporate macroeconomic factors in the 
analysis; we measure the regional financial sector development using other indicators 
such as Lerner index; and we use data that covers a 9-year horizon (and not only 1 year 
as La Rocca et al. 2010). This circumstance allows us to use the panel data methodology 
and to avoid limitations of cross-section studies. 
 
Second, the choice of Spain as the country under study also adds value to this research 
in several ways. On the one hand, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are 
unquestionably the leading actors in Spanish business (over 99% of all companies in 
Spain are SMEs -DIRCE-). On the other hand, Spain exhibits certain regional 
heterogeneity. Its regions have a great capacity for self-government. Moreover, they 
present significant regional differences in the economic situation (Cuadrado-Roura 
2010) and in the banking system (Carbó et al. 2003). For all these reasons, Spain is a 
very interesting case-study of regional aspects in SMEs. Furthermore, this work is the 
first study that attempts to analyse the effects of institutional factors in the debt of 
Spanish SMEs. Although, it is true that the study of Palacín-Sánchez et al. (2012) finds 
regional differences in Spanish SMEs between the level of debt and its firm-factor 
determinants, the institutional factors that may be the origin of these regional 
differences are not specifically examined. Our paper constitutes a continuation of this 
line of research. 
 
The results of our paper suggest that the capital structure depends on the regional 
financial system and the regional economic situation. Hence, institutional factors at a 
regional level must be taken into account to explain the financing decisions of SMEs. 
These results are highly significant and should help policymakers understand the 
institutional origin of these differences and aid in their elimination.  It makes no sense 
for these differences to persist within a single country when working at a European level 
towards the convergence of SMEs by improving, among other aspects, access to 
finance.  
 
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 identifies the institutional 
factors that have a greater influence on corporate financing choices, in accordance with 
theoretical and empirical studies, and thereby formulates the hypotheses of our study. 
Section 3 presents the sample of firms, defines the variables to be studied, and shows 
descriptive statistics for all variables considered. Section 4 describes the model and the 
methodology to be used in our analysis, while Section 5 presents the empirical results. 
Finally, in Section 6, conclusions are drawn.  
 
Institutional factors: theory and evidence 
 
The factors of the institutional environment in which the firm does business can affect 
its capital structure. Empirical evidence about the impact of institutional factors on the 
capital structure decisions requires the use of a sample of firms located in different 
geographical zones. The majority of these studies carry out cross-country comparisons. 
Certain studies use samples of listed firms. Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) 
examine the capital structure in 30 developed and developing countries. They show that 
the differences in financing patterns are mostly due to the differences in the 
development of stock markets and banks, as well as the differences in the underlying 
legal infrastructure.  Booth et al. (2001), in an analysis of 10 developing countries, find 
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that the debt ratios of firms located in these developing countries seem to be affected by 
the same firm factors as those of developed countries. However, differences are noted in 
the way in which debt is affected by country factors, such as GDP growth rates, 
inflation rates and the development of the capital market. López-Iturriaga and 
Rodríguez-Sanz (2008) analyse 10 developed countries, grouping the firms based on the 
legal system in force in its zone (common law, German civil law, and French civil law). 
They find that the legal and institutional system of each country not only affects the 
firm capital structure but also conditions how firm factors influence the capital 
structure. The work of De Jong et al. (2008) analyses the capital structure of firms 
located in 42 developed and developing countries. It observes that country factors, such 
as creditor protection, the degree of development of the public and private debt market 
and the GDP growth rate have a significant influence on corporate capital structure. 
González and González (2008) analyse the effect of bank market concentration and 
institutions on capital structure in 39 countries. They conclude that these institutional 
factors affect capital structure and firm-factor determinants of leverage. Fan et al. 
(2012) examine 39 developed and developing countries, and find that a country’s legal 
and tax systems, corruption, and the preferences of capital suppliers explain a 
significant portion of the variation in leverage. Finally, Kirch and Terra (2012) test 
whether financial development and/or institutional quality have any effect on corporate 
debt maturity decisions on a sample of firms from 5 South American countries. While 
financial development remains an important determinant of debt maturity, institutional 
quality holds no influence. 
 
Other studies use samples of SMEs. Giannetti (2003) compares small and large firms in 
8 countries in the European Union and finds significant country differences between the 
debt level and the debt maturity. Moreover, these differences are especially relevant 
among non-listed firms. Certain country factors, such as the protection of lenders, the 
enforcement law and the degree of financial development can be considered as 
responsible for these differences. Similarly, Utrero-González (2007), on data of 
different-sized firms located in 11 developed countries, reaches the conclusion that the 
consideration of banking regulation and other institutional variables significantly 
improves the understanding of capital structure decisions. Moreover, it seems that 
SMEs are more subject to the legal environment of their countries than are large firms. 
Hernández-Cánovas and Koëter-Kant (2011), using a sample of SMEs from 19 
European countries, show the influence of a country’s legal and institutional 
environment on bank loan maturity.   
 
The latest advances in the studies that analyse the effect of institutional factors on 
leverage have been to compare zones (regions) of a single country. This type of study is 
more suitable for SMEs, since individual country-level studies would offer a more 
useful way to understand financial contracting for SMEs, as Qian and Strahan (2007) 
point out. In this sense, capital structure of SMEs is likely to be influenced significantly 
by a set of regional institutional factors (Petersen and Rajan 1994; Demirguç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 1998, 1999), and these are difficult to observe and control across a large 
number of countries. Moreover, this type of study, in contrast to the aforementioned 
cross-country studies, presents the basic advantage of a reduction of the difficulty in 
setting up the relation between the firms' financing decisions and the various 
institutional factors (Wald and Long 2007). This advantage arises since, when zones 
from a single-country are compared, the study sets out from a more homogeneous 
situation, given that many institutional factors are shared.  
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Among the very few regional studies carried out in the area of capital structure research 
in SMEs, that of La Rocca et al. (2010), performed in Italy, should be highlighted. 
These authors analyse whether the regional financial development and the efficiency of 
judicial enforcement have any effect on financing decisions. The results achieved 
support the starting hypothesis: capital structure is not only the result of firm factors but 
also of the influence of regional factors. 
 
Our article follows this last line of research. Specifically, the role of regional factors is 
studied in order to explain the financing decisions in Spanish SMEs. In accordance with 
previous empirical evidence and within the Spanish context, the regional institutional 
factors that we consider in this study are: the development of the financial sector and the 
economic situation. We now present these factors and formulate a series of hypotheses 
linked to them. 
 
Development of the Financial Sector  
 
The development of the financial sector (banking sector) is one of the institutional 
factors that is considered in explaining the decisions on capital structure in the studies 
that carry out comparisons across countries: Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999); 
Booth et al. (2001); Giannetti  (2003); Utrero-González (2007); De Jong et al. (2008); 
González and González (2008) and Kirch and Terra (2012).   
 
Most of these studies, following Diamond (1984), consider the significant role played 
by banks in the mitigation of problems arising from asymmetric information regarding 
credit risk, which particularly affect SMEs. Financial intermediaries enjoy economies of 
scale in the acquisition of information, and, thanks to the information collected, also 
have a greater incentive than that of individual investors to lend to borrowers. 
Following this line of argument, a more developed banking sector is expected to 
facilitate access to external finance, especially to SMEs which suffer more restrictions 
for credit. Other studies, according to Petersen and Rajan (1995), consider the effect of 
competition in the banking market on lending relationships. Lenders are more likely to 
finance credit-constrained firms when the banking market is not very competitive since 
it is easier for lenders to internalize the benefits of dealing with these firms. Along this 
line of reasoning, a concentrated banking sector is expected to facilitate credit access, 
especially to SMEs. Alternatively, a more competitive banking market would encourage 
lenders to build stronger relationships with clients in order to attain a distinctive 
competitive edge, thereby focusing more on relationship banking for the solution of 
problems of asymmetric information (Boot and Thakor 2000).  
 
Within a country, differences in regional financial sectors also help explain differences 
in the capital structure of firm across regions. Studies such as those of Petersen and 
Rajan (1995), and La Rocca et al. (2010) confirm this idea. These divergences among 
the regional banking sector would become irrelevant in the case that firms had the 
possibility to access any financial market. However, for SMEs, their possibilities of 
access to financial markets (national or international) are inexistent. Moreover, they can 
also experience limitations in accessing financial companies that do business in other 
regions (Guiso et al. 2004).  
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We focus our study on SMEs within Spain. Spain has a financial system with a bank-
based structure; therefore SMEs depend highly on banks to obtain loans. There are three 
banking groups in Spain: the commercial banks, the savings banks, and the cooperative 
banks in rural areas. While the big commercial banks and saving banks have a national 
action area, the small and medium-sized saving banks and some small and medium-
sized commercial banks are regionally oriented. If the financial intermediaries present in 
each region differ, it makes sense that the regional banking sector could vary across 
regions. In this sense, Carbó et al. (2003) find that the degree of development of the 
regional financial system in Spain is not homogeneous and also identify that there are 
significant differences in terms of concentration, prices, and other competition 
indicators. Moreover, these differences in the regional financial sectors seem to affect 
SMEs (Carbó et al. 2009 for the Spanish case and Lehmann et al. 2004 for the German 
case, where banks of a similar nature to those in Spain coexist). 
 
Consequently, according to the aforementioned empirical research, it is to be expected 
that the development of the regional financial sector has an effect on leverage; however 
the sign of this relation is ambiguous. Therefore, we state our first hypothesis as 
follows: 
 
H1. Development of the financial sector significantly affects firm leverage. 
 
The Economic Situation 
  
In general, the conditions of the economy are normally taken as institutional factors in 
order to explain the capital structure of firms when carrying out cross-country 
comparisons (Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999; Booth et al. 2001; De Jong et al. 
2008; Fan et al. 2012).  We believe that the study of the effect of the economic situation 
on the financial structure of companies around the world can also be applied across 
Spanish regions. According to Cuadrado-Roura (2010), Spanish regions show 
significant differences in their economic situations and it is expected that these 
differences affect SMEs.  These economic differences between regions are due to a 
variety of historical reasons and to the differences in the economic policies developed in 
each region thanks to the fact that each region is self-governing.  
 
One of most important factors that illustrates the economic situation is the economic 
growth.This factor affects financing decisions since the growth of the economy is an 
indicator of the firms’ financing needs. If investment opportunities and the economy are 
correlated, then the more an economy grows, the more resources companies need.  
Moreover, the empirical evidence above has verified a positive impact of economic 
growth on debt. It seems that in zones (countries) with relatively higher economic 
growth, firms use higher levels of debt to finance new investment. Therefore, we set out 
the second of our hypotheses: 
 
H2. The economic growth has a positive effect on firm leverage.  
 
Another indicator of the economic situation is the inflation rate. This rate provides, on 
the one hand, an indicator of the economic administration of the government, and, on 
the other hand, indicates if the local currency provides a stable measure to be used in 
long-term contracts. Empirical evidence has almost always verified a negative relation 
between inflation and the debt ratio (Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999; Booth et 
7 
 
al. 2001 and Hernández-Cánovas and Koëter-Kant 2011). According to these studies, 
high and/or variable rates of inflation render it costly for investors and firms to take out 
loans. In this sense, despite the fact that inflation increases the monetary value of the 
firm's assets, the higher interest rate and monetary risk caused by inflation causes the 
debt ratio to fall.  Although it is true that Fan et al. (2012) obtain non-significant results, 
we formulate the third of our hypotheses as follows: 
 
H3. Inflation has a negative effect on firm leverage. 
 
Data collection, variables, and descriptive statistics  
 
Data  
 
We need firm-level data and region-level data to carry out the empirical study. The 
firms of our sample are obtained from the SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances 
Ibéricos) database constructed by Bureau Van Dijk. This database is the largest source 
of financial information on non-financial Spanish SMEs.  The sample period covers the 
years 1999 to 2007. The firms selected are within the European Commission definition 
(2003)3 of SMEs for every year under consideration. Moreover, we require that the 
firms of our sample possess: a) positive equity and positive financial year results in 
every period; and b) data available for the study period. The final sample consists of 638 
firms which cover the 17 Spanish regions; hence we have balanced panel data with 5742 
firm-year observations.  
 
On the other hand, region-level data is obtained from various sources, mainly from the 
Bank of Spain, and the Spanish Statistical Office. Further regional variables are taken 
from previous empirical studies.   
 
Firm Variables   
 
Leverage. The first firm-variable is the leverage. This is the dependent variable in our 
study. Following, among others, Van der Wijst and Thurik  (1993), Michaelas et al. 
(1999),  Giannetti (2003), Sogorb-Mira (2005), Utrero-González (2007),  La Rocca et 
al. (2010), and Degryse et al. (2012), we use the total debt ratio (DEBT) to reflect the 
capital structure of the firm, and estimate it as the quotient between total debt and total 
assets. This ratio is based on book values since the firms of the sample are unlisted. The 
average total debt ratio is 59.24% for the total sample of Spanish SMEs, i.e. more than 
half of the resources used by SMEs to finance their investments are liabilities. These 
high levels of debt are relatively usual in European SMEs (Giannetti 2003, Hall et al. 
2004, and Psillaki and Daskilakis 2009). 
 
In a first approach, we can assess geographical differences in financing decisions by 
comparing region by region the level of debt for firms in our sample. Figure 1 presents 
the average ratio of total debt for each of the 17 regions; we also add the value for the 
total sample of Spanish companies. La Rioja has the lowest total-debt ratio, whereas 
Castile-La Mancha has the highest. Moreover, if the regions are ordered according to 
their level of debt (Figure 2), we can observe two groups of regions. The first group (10 
regions) has debt ratios very close or slightly lower than the average debt ratio of all 
Spanish SMEs (Spain is denoted by the bold line in Figure 2). The second group (7 
regions) has a debt ratio higher than that of the total sample. Not only do these results 
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suggest that there are regional differences in the capital structure of SMEs across 
regions, but these differences are also statistically significant according to the analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) performed4.   
 
Another aspect worth mentioning is that those regions with lower leverage are also the 
regions that have higher  GDP per capita, (in 7 of these 10 regions, GDP was higher 
than 100% of the 1999-2007 average for the EU-275 (these regions are denoted by 
clearer lines in Figure 2)), while those regions with a higher leverage are also regions 
with lower GDP per capita, (in 6 of these 7 regions GDP was less than 100% of the 
1999-2007 average for the EU-27 (these regions are denoted by darker lines in Figure 
2)). Furthermore, the regions with highest GDP per capita and lowest total debt ratio are 
located for the most part in northeastern Spain. These results suggest that SMEs in less 
developed regions are more in debt. These differences seem to be related to institutional 
factors, since it is possible to consider that GDP per capita is a proxy of a set of 
institutional factors that have operated over the years in the various geographical areas 
(Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998 and Fan et al. 2012).   
 
Bearing all these reasons in mind, this study is fully justified. In the remainder of the 
article, we strive to identify which regional factors are relevant and how they affect the 
financing decisions of SMEs.  
 
Figure1. Total debt ratio across regions  
 
Note: the figure presents the ratio of the average total debt to total assets for firms in each region for the 
period 1999-2007.  
 
Figure 2. Total debt ratio across regions in ascending order 
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Notes: the regions are ordered by their level of leverage. The darker lines correspond to regions with a 
GDP per capita less than 100% of the 1999–2007 average for the EU-27. Spain is denoted by the bold 
line. 
 
Firm-factor determinants of leverage. The other variables considered for the firm 
include the characteristics of its determinants of debt. We cannot forget that the capital 
structure is determined by a combination of factors: firm factors and institutional 
factors. Therefore, not only do we have to consider institutional factors in our empirical 
study but also firm factors. These are independent variables in this study. According to 
previous theoretical and empirical studies, six characteristics of firms are used: size, 
asset structure, profitability, growth, risk, and age, and are defined as follows. Size of 
firm (SIZE) is measured as the logarithm of total assets (Sogorb-Mira 2005 Degryse et 
al. 2012, and La Rocca et al. 2010). Asset structure (AS) is estimated as the net fixed 
assets divided by the total assets of the firm (Rajan and Zingales 1995, Booth et al. 
2001, Giannetti 2003, Sogorb-Mira 2005, De Jong et al. 2008, and La Rocca et al. 
2010). Profitability (PROF) is defined as the ratio between earnings before interest, 
taxes, amortization and depreciation and the total assets (Rajan and Zingales 1995, 
Sogorb-Mira 2005, De Jong et al. 2008 and La Rocca et al. 2010). Growth (GROWTH) 
is measured as the growth of the assets, calculated as the annual change of the total 
assets of the firm (Degryse et al. 2012). Business risk (RISK) is defined as the standard 
deviation of earnings before interest and taxes during the sample period over the book 
value of total assets (Booth et al. 2001, De Jong et al. 2008, and Psillaki and Daskalakis 
2009). Finally, the age of the firm (AGE) is measured as the logarithm of the number of 
years that the firm has been operating (La Rocca et al. 2010).  
 
According to previous literature on capital structure in SMEs, there is a relative 
consensus that leverage of firms has a positive relationship with firm size, asset 
structure and growth, and a negative relationship with profitability, business risk and 
age.  
 
Regional Variables 
 
The regional variables are related with the institutional factors considered in this study. 
These are the development of the financial sector and the economic situation. These are 
independent variables in our empirical analysis and are defined below.  
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We show the degree of development of the Spanish regional banking sector with three 
variables. The first is the ratio of regional bank deposits to the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) which Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), La Rocca et al. (2010) and Fan 
et al. (2012) use as a proxy of development of the financial intermediaries. The original 
idea is that regions with higher deposits have more funds available for the financing of 
the investment of SMEs. However empirical evidence is mixed: this variable is not 
significant in Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), it has a positive relation in La 
Rocca et al. (2010), and a negative relation in Fan et al. (2012).  
 
The second variable is the number of regional bank branches per 10,000 inhabitants (La 
Rocca et al. 2010). Following Petersen and Rajan (2002) and La Rocca et al. (2010), 
more branches that a certain bank maintains within a zone, the closer their relationship 
with SMEs becomes, and the easier it is to finance these SMEs. Most studies find a 
positive relationship. Both indicators of the bank system come from the Bank of Spain 
 
The third variable is the Lerner index. This is an indicator of competition in the banking 
sector. The Lerner index has been successfully employed in banking research by Berger 
et al. (2009) and Jiménez et al. (2010), and this indicator was employed for the first time 
in the literature of firm financing constraints by Carbó et al. (2009). The use of this 
variable in capital structure research is novel. The Lerner index is measured as the 
difference between the output prices and the marginal costs divided by output prices, 
and is obtained from the study of Carbó et al. (2009)6. This index varies between 0 and 
1, where 0 means high competition in the banking sector while 1 signifies the existence 
of market power.  
 
We reflect the economic situation with two variables. First, we measure the economic 
growth with the average annual growth rate in GDP per capita. Second, the inflation rate 
is measured as the yearly change in consumer prices. These variables come from the 
Spanish Statistical Office.  
 
Moreover, a developed economy indicator, GDP per capita, is included since it may 
capture certain institutional factors that are not shown by the other regional variables 
already considered (Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998, and Fan et al. 2012).  This 
variable also comes from the Spanish Statistical Office. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
DEBT 5742 0.592 0.216 0.033 0.988 
SIZE 5742 8.588 0.725 6.202 10.660 
AS 5742 0.331 0.214 0.000 0.989 
PROF 5742 0.129 0.089 -0.302 0.904 
GROWTH 5742 0.146 0.304 -0.824 9.375 
RISK 5742 0.053 0.068 0.003 1.168 
AGE 5742 2.896 0.530 0.405 4.691 
Deposits/GDP 5742 0.841 0.214 0.449 1.602 
Nº bank branches 5742 10.007 1.711 5.858 16.088 
Lerner index 5742 0.094 0.045 0.011 0.211 
GDP Growth 5742 0.061 0.013 0.021 0.094 
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Inflation rate 5742 0.033 0.005 0.017 0.041 
GDP per capita (€) 5742 19,947.35 4857.61 9202 30,562 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all the variables of the study. Specifically, it 
presents the mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values of debt, firm-
factors, and regional institutional factors. These values are estimated as the average of 
the 17 regions taken into account over the period 1999-2007, and hence each region has 
one single observation. Differences are noted between institutional factors across 
regions. It remains to be ascertained whether these regional institutional differences 
impose any statistically significant effect on the financing decisions of SMEs. 
 
Table 2 shows the correlations between all the variables of the study. Debt has a 
significant relation with all factors, both company and institutional, with the exception 
of the variables representing the number of regional bank branches per 10,000 
inhabitants and that of the inflation rate. Moreover, the relationships between factors 
related to the development of the banking sector, factors related to economic conditions, 
and factors related to the firm all remain low, thereby showing that multi-collinearity is 
not a concern.  
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 
TDR SIZE AS PROF GROWTH RISK AGE Deposits/
GDP
Nº bank 
branches
Lerner index GDP Growth GDP per 
capita
Inflation rate
DEBT 1
SIZE -0.1377* 1
AS -0.0969* 0.0066 1
PROF -0.3045* -0.1448* 0.1926* 1
GROWTH 0.1986* 0.0251* -0.0590* 0.0371* 1
RISK -0.1999* -0.2492* -0.0755* 0.4544* 0.0745* 1
AGE -0.3180* 0.2892* -0,0106 -0.0940* -0.1580* -0.2513* 1
Deposits/GDP -0.0289* 0.0997* -0.0861* 0.0013 -0.0598* -0.0306* 0.1267* 1
Nº bank branches -0.0035 0.0109 -0.0189 0.0099 -0.0122 -0.0844* 0.0703* 0.0684* 1
Lerner index -0.0605* 0.1929* -0.021 -0.0988* -0.0277* -0.1759* 0.1880* 0.2823* -0.1174* 1
GDP Growth 0.1006* -0.1611* 0.0174 0.0338* 0.0827* 0.1124* -0.1439* -0.1389* -0.0383* -0.0889* 1
GDP per capita -0.1550* 0.1708* -0.1187* -0.0279* -0.1030* -0.1255* 0.2614* 0.5885* 0.2086* 0.4032* -0.3919* 1
Inflation rate -0.0141 -0.0158 -0.0503* 0.0321* -0.0285* 0.0343* 0.0260* 0.1342* 0.0542* -0.0992* 0.1012* 0.2443* 1
Note: *Statistically significant at 90%.
 
 
Model and analysis methodology  
 
In this section, the equation model and the econometric methodology used to test our 
hypotheses are presented. The determinants of the total debt ratio according to previous 
empirical and theoretical studies are included in the following equation model. The 
model, in addition to firm variables, includes variables that represent regional 
institutional factors such as: the Deposits/GDP ratio, Nº regional bank branches, Lerner 
index, GDP Growth, Inflation rate, and GDP per capita: 
 
DEBTit  = β0 + β1SIZEit  + β2  ASit  + β3  PROFit  + β4  GROWTHit  +β5  AGEit  +β6 
RISKit+  β7 Deposits/GDPjt +  β8 Nº regional bank branchesjt+  β9 LERNERjt +   
β10 GDP Growthjt +β11 Inflation Rate jt + β12 GDP per capitajt + ui +єit 
 
where i is the firm,  j is the region, and t is the time period.   
 
In this work, panel data is used. In our opinion, this methodology constitutes the best 
option to explore our hypotheses, since it considers individual unobservable 
heterogeneity, gives more information, yields fewer collinearity problems, incorporates 
more degrees of freedom, and is more efficient. 
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For the specification of the econometric model, it is necessary to make statistical 
assumptions about the unobservable components.  The term, єit , indicates the traditional 
stochastic error  of the classic linear regression model for which it is assumed that the 
mean is equal to zero and the variance is constant. The term, ui, represents the 
individual effects that define the unobservable heterogeneity of the model. These two 
terms together represent our “ignorance”. When individual effects exist, it is not 
possible to use classic ordinary least-squared estimation (OLS) since it produces bias 
and incorrect values. In our case, individual effects are highly probable, and hence the 
within-group estimator is used which is a consistent estimator that makes individual 
effects disappear. To confirm the existence of individual effects, the F test is carried out. 
Moreover, to ascertain whether the individual effects are fixed or random, the Hausman 
test is also performed. In our analysis, the first test confirms that a within model is a 
better option than a classic OLS estimation and the second test confirms that the fixed-
effect model is better than the random-effect model. 
 
Results 
 
In this section, regressions are presented that estimate the influence of regional factors 
upon leverage, and consider firm characteristics (Table 3). The regressions are 
estimated with within fixed-effect approach. While Column 1, in Table 3, shows the 
results of the first model which uses only firm variables, Column 2 presents the results 
of a second model estimated with firm and regional variables. The first and the second 
regression have an adjusted R2 of 0.239 and 0.277, respectively.  These results suggest 
that it is convenient to consider the regional factors to better explain the capital structure 
of SMEs. Moreover, in previous studies, where panel analysis on samples of Spanish 
SMEs is used and regional factors are not considered (Sogorb-Mira 2005, and Giannetti 
2003), their R2 remain much lower than ours7.  
 
Table 3. Determinants of total debt ratio (within fixed-effect estimation)  
 
Variables  1  2 
Intercept 0.325*** -0.145*** 
(-0.0376) (-0.0543) 
SIZE 0.108*** 0.129*** 
(0.005) (-0.0054) 
AS 0.023*** 0.0168 
(0.012) (-0.0114) 
PROF 
-0.162** -0.164*** 
(0.018) (-0.0180) 
GROWTH 0.037*** 0.033*** 
(0.003) (-0.0035) 
RISK 0.476*** 0.531*** 
(0.038) (0.0374) 
AGE 
-0.234*** -0.126*** 
(0.008) (0.0107) 
Deposits/GDP 
  -0.075*** 
(0.0144) 
Nº bank branches 
  0.015*** 
(0.0036) 
Lerner index 
  -0.095*** 
(0.0285) 
GDP Growth 
  0.433*** 
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(0.1051) 
Inflation rate 
  0.0139 
    (0.2319) 
GDP per capita 
  -0.000006*** 
(0.000) 
Adjusted R square 0.239 0.277 
F test 267.32*** 162.82*** 
F test that all ui=0 56.67*** 58.25*** 
Hausman test 280.94*** 574.99*** 
Num. of observations  5742 5742 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *Statistically significant at 90%; ** statistically significant at 
95%; *** statistically significant at 99%. 
 
The top half of Table 3 provides the coefficients of firm factors considered in our study.  
On the one hand, these firm factors are significant in explaining the total debt ratio. 
Moreover, when the regional factors in the regression are introduced (Model 2 of Table 
3), all firm variables are still relevant; with the exception of asset structure, which loses 
its influence. On the other hand, the sign of the relationships between leverage and firm 
factors is positive for size, asset structure, and risk; and negative with profit, and age. 
These results coincide with those expected according to previous empirical studies (for 
SMEs: Michaelas et al. 1999, Hall et al. 2004, Sogorb-Mira 2005, and Degryse et al. 
2012). The only firm variable that has a sign opposite to that expected is that of  
business risk; however this also occurred in earlier empirical evidence (Booth et al. 
2001, De Jong et al. 2008, and Psillaki and Daskalakis 2009). 
 
Model 2, in Table 3, also shows the coefficients of the regional institutional factors 
under consideration in our study. On the one hand, the three proxies used of the 
development of the regional financial sector are statistically significant in explaining 
debt. Therefore, hypothesis H1. Development of the financial sector significantly affects 
firm leverage is verified. In order to understand the nature of this relationship, each of 
the three regional financial variables needs to be analysed individually.  
 
The first regional financial variable, the ratio of regional bank deposits to GDP, 
negatively influences the level of debt. This result coincides with that found in a study 
by Fan et al. (2012). It seems that the debt ratio is higher in regions with relatively 
smaller bank deposits.  However, the mixed empirical results of this variable in previous 
studies questions the goodness of this variable as a proxy of the degree of financial 
development, as La Rocca et al. (2010), and Fan et al. (2012) also point out.  In fact, 
deposits constitute only a minority of the resources available to financial institutions, 
and hence their connection with debt may be less tenuous. The lender has access to a lot 
of resources by means of financial markets or other financial institutions. It is also 
possible that this ratio is representative of other variables. For example, the ratio of 
regional bank deposits may reflect the savings rate. In this sense, if saving rates rise in a 
region, then this is possibly correlated with the highest availability in the system of 
internal resources rather than with external resources, such as credits, to fund 
investments, which could explain this negative connection between the ratio of 
deposits/GDP to debt.   
 
The second regional financial variable, the number of regional bank branches per 
10,000 inhabitants, has a positive relation with debt. This result suggests that in Spain, 
as in Italy (La Rocca et al. 2010), the presence of many bank branches favours bank 
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financing in SMEs; however in the Italian study this variable remains either 
insignificant or weakly significant. The reason may lie in one of the characteristics of 
the Spanish banking system: the high number of bank branches. While in Italy the 
number of bank branches per 10,000 population is an average of 5.45, according to the 
study of La Rocca et al. (2010), in Spain there is an average of 108. Therefore, the closer 
proximity of financial institutions to SMEs, expressed as the number of bank branches, 
implies a greater possibility to obtain resources to finance investments.  
 
The third regional financial variable, the Lerner index, negatively influences debt. This 
index is an indicator of competition in the banking sector; therefore our result suggests 
that the more competitive the regional banking sector, the higher the level of debt. This 
finding is in accordance with Boot and Thakor (2000), who proposed that a more 
competitive banking market could encourage lenders to build a lending relationship in 
order to obtain a competitive advantage and to resolve the problems of asymmetric 
information. It is possible that such a high number of bank branches in Spain promotes 
competitiveness in the banking sector. 
 
On the other hand, we use two indicators of the regional economic situation. The first 
variable is the annual growth rate in GDP per capita. This is significant and has a 
positive impact on debt, thus confirming hypothesis H2. Our findings are in line with 
previous studies such as Booth et al. (2001), and De Jong et al. (2008). It seems that 
companies are more prone to use debt to finance their investments in regions with 
greater growth. 
 
The second regional economic variable, the inflation rate, is unrelated to debt. This is 
also shown in a study by Fan et al. (2012). Therefore, hypothesis H3 is rejected. It is 
reasonable that this variable at regional level has a low effect since financial 
intermediaries consider the inflation rate of the whole country when fixing credit 
conditions. Nevertheless, differences in inflation rates affect the firms that do business 
in each region, and hence an analysis of its effect is justified.   
 
The regional GDP per capita is the last institutional variable considered here. This factor 
is significant in explaining the debt of SMEs. Regarding the sign of the relationship, this 
variable negatively influences the leverage. This result suggests that the debt ratio of 
SMEs is higher in less developed Spanish regions. In the descriptive analysis, it was 
pointed out that the regions with lower leverage are also those regions that have higher 
GDP per capita. A possible explanation is that less developed regions have fewer 
resources of their own to invest, and therefore must rely on debt. Moreover, in these 
regions, the local government has probably pressured financial institutions, especially 
the savings banks that do business in their area, to grant external financing (credits) to 
new investment projects and thereby to further the economic development. The study by 
Fan et al. (2012) also obtained a negative relationship between economic development 
and level of debt; however its unit of analysis is that of country and not region. 
 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we run a set of additional analyses. On 
the one hand, there are indications that the model can be affected by problems of 
endogeneity due to the simultaneity among DEBT, SIZE, AS, PROF, and GROWTH, 
and a biased result can be implied.  To handle this problem, the two-stage least square 
within estimator is applied by using the first lag of DEBT, SIZE, AS, PROF and 
GROWTH as instrumental variables. Column 1, in Table 4, presents the results of 
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regression that are estimated with instrumental variables (2SLS-IV). The Sargan test, 
whose result is given at the bottom of Column 1, confirms the validity of instrumental 
variables because the null hypothesis of a lack of correlation between instrumental 
variables and the residuals is not rejected, and therefore they remain acceptable 
according to this criterion. In general, the results using instruments are similar to those 
shown earlier (Column 2, in Table 3); the only exception being that inflation negatively 
affects debt, which confirms our hypothesis H3. However this relation still remains 
insignificant.  
 
Table 4.  Determinants of Total Debt Ratio (2SLS-IV Estimation)  
 
  All regions  Omitting  Madrid  Omitting Catalonia  
Variables 1 2 3 
Intercept -0.135*** -0.100*** -0.217*** 
(0.058) (0.062) (0.066) 
SIZE 0.128*** 0.122*** 0.133*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
AS 0.016 0.017 0.0155 
(0.012) 0.0127 (0.014) 
PROF 
-0.171*** -0.183*** -0.188*** 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.024) 
GROWTH 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.0365*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.0045) 
RISK 0.504*** 0.465*** 0.540*** 
(0.040) (0.048) (0.050) 
AGE 
-0.125*** -0.130*** -0.114*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.0131) 
Deposits/GDP 
-0.074*** -0.051** -0.076*** 
(0.015) (0.026) (0.016) 
Nº bank branches 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Lerner index 
-0.095*** -0.133*** -0.138*** 
(0.030) (0.032) (0.034) 
GDP Growth 0.409*** 0.461*** 0.483*** 
(0.112) (0.117) (0.121) 
Inflation rate 
-0.053 -0.269 -0.026 
  (0.247) (0.270) (0.267) 
GDP per capita 
-0.000006*** -0.000005*** -0.000007*** 
(0.0000008) (0.0000008) (0.0000009) 
Adjusted R square 0.274 0.259 0.28.8 
Wald test 375182.46*** 341721.77*** 286460*** 
F test that all ui=0 52.78***   57.42*** 52.89*** 
Hausman test 466.65*** 315.03*** 257.85*** 
Sargan test 134.27 137.15 139.33 
Num. of observations  5104 4240 3880 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *Statistically significant at 90%; ** statistically significant at 95%; *** 
statistically significant at 99%. 
 
On the other hand, those regions of the sample with the most firms are omitted from the 
regressions in order to ascertain if any of them has a disproportionate influence on the 
results. These regions are Madrid and Catalonia, with 108 and 153 firms, respectively. 
The results of the two-stage least square within estimator for the whole sample whilst 
omitting only the region of Madrid (Column 2, in Table 4)) and omitting only the region 
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of Catalonia (Column 3, in Table 4)  are very similar to our earlier findings, not only in 
size and sign of the coefficients, but also in the levels of significance.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper studies the role of institutional factors in the debt of SMEs from a regional 
perspective. Specifically, it analyses the effect of the development of the financial sector 
and of the economic situation on leverage of firms, using a sample of 638 SMEs from 
17 Spanish regions.   
 
Overall, our results suggest that is crucial to consider the regional factors to explain the 
capital structure of SMEs. The empirical model that includes not only firm factors (firm 
size, asset structure, profitability, growth, business risk and age) but also regional 
institutional factors, better explains the debt of SMEs.  
 
One of the institutional factors considered, the development of the regional financial 
sector, affects the capital structure of SMEs. In this sense, the three proxies used for  
this institutional factor are statistically significant variables for leverage.  The first 
regional financial variable, the ratio of regional bank deposits to GDP, negatively 
influences the level of debt. It seems that the debt ratio is higher in regions with 
relatively smaller bank deposits. The second regional financial variable, the number of 
regional bank branches per 10,000 inhabitants, has a positive relation with debt. This 
result suggests that in Spain the presence of many bank branches favours external 
financing in SMEs. Therefore, the closer proximity of financial institutions to SMEs, 
expressed as the number of bank branches, implies a greater possibility to find credit to 
finance investments. The third regional financial variable, the Lerner index, negatively 
influences debt. This index is a proxy of competition in the banking sector, therefore 
this result suggests that the more competitive the regional banking sector becomes, the 
higher the level of debt there is.  
 
Furthermore, we find a certain influence of the regional economic situation on the 
capital structure of SMEs. First, the annual growth rate in GDP per capita is significant 
and has a positive impact on debt. It seems that companies use more debt to finance 
their investments in regions with greater growth. Second, the inflation rate is found to 
be unrelated to debt.  
 
Finally, the regional GDP per capita is significant in explaining the debt of SMEs. 
Regarding the sign of the relationship, this variable negatively influences the leverage. 
This result suggests that the debt ratio of SMEs is higher in less developed Spanish 
regions. A possible explanation is that less developed regions have fewer resources of 
their own to invest, and therefore must rely on debt.  
 
To sum up, the evidence of this paper is in line with previous empirical studies that 
confirm that the institutional factors influence how the firms are financed (Demirguç-
Kunt and Maksimovic 1999, Booth et al. 2001, Giannetti 2003, De Jong et al. 2008, 
González and González 2008, Hernández-Cánovas and Koëter-Kant 2011, and Fan et al. 
2012 cross-country comparisons, and La Rocca et al. 2010 cross-region comparisons). 
Our findings should help the policymaker to understand the origin of regional 
differences in the financing of SMEs and to succeed in reducing said differences. This 
support is highly relevant, since one of the reasons why regional economic development 
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remains without converging after so many years of democracy is based on the regional 
divergences in financing SMEs. 
 
For future research along these lines of research, we propose: a) finding and analysing 
other institutional factors that affect the capital structure of SMEs; b) comparing the 
regional results of Spain with those of other countries; c) employing more indicators for 
the measurement of the development of the financial system; d) ascertaining the 
relevant unit of analysis. 
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Note  
                                                 
1
 Other studies only compare the leverage and its firm-factor determinants in companies belonging to 
different geographical areas. Among these studies we highlight Rajan and Zingales (1995), Hall et al. 
(2004), Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) and Palacín-Sánchez et al. (2012). 
2
 The first two papers also include large and listed companies. 
3
 The SMEs are defined by three indicators: (i) the number of employees is equal to or greater than 10 and 
less than 250; (ii) operating incomes are of over two million euros and less than fifty million euros; (iii) 
total assets are of over two million euros and less than forty-three million euros. 
4
 One-way ANOVA F statistic is equal to 18.44. This is statistically significant at 99%. 
5
 Eurostat Regional Yearbooks (1999-2007). 
6According to Carbó et al. (2009), the price of total assets is directly computed from the bank-level 
auxiliary data as the average ratio of “bank revenue/total assets” for the banks operating in a given region 
using the distribution of branches of banks in the different regions as the weighting factor. Marginal costs 
are estimated from a translog cost function with a single output (total assets) and three inputs (deposits, 
labour costs and physical capital) by using two-stage least squares and fixed bank effects. 
7
 The adjusted R-squares in Sogorb-Mira (2005) and in Giannetti (2003) are 0.083 and 0.19, respectively. 
8
 In Spain this variable is the largest in the European Union (Gallego et al. 2002).  
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